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Abstract
One of the chief aims of schooling is learners’ general (cognitive, moral and emotional)
development, in order to prepare them ‘to live in the world’. Cognitive or mental
development is characteristically achieved through the acquisition and elicitation of
knowledge. In this regard, recent trends have focused on ‘knowledge diversity’ and
‘different ways of knowing’, by emphasising understanding and the social and cultural
nature of knowledge. In response to these trends, I wish to tighten in this paper the link
between knowledge and truth. The educational significance of truth, and of related concepts
like facts, reality and objectivity, will assume a central role here. I argue that, ultimately,
the only coherent and consistent position is a realist view of the pertinent issues and ideas –
indeed, also as an approach to teaching and learning.
Social justice and epistemology: the case of South
Africa
What happened elsewhere in the world after the 1960s, as an outgrowth of the
civil rights movement in the US, was that predominantly material issues and
concerns were increasingly replaced by a focus on culture, diversity and
identity matters, especially in politics and education. Understandably, the
pertinent debates began flourishing in South Africa only after 1994. While
these trends were, and are, clearly to be welcomed, there has been some
collateral damage – in South Africa as elsewhere –, the rise of relativism, post-
modernism, and constructivism being readily available examples in this
regard. With regard to education in particular, epistemology became a prime
target, and truth (and related ideas like objectivity, reality and facts) rapidly
fell out of favour in educational discourse. The aim of the present paper is to
restore these concepts, and to gesture towards realism both as a learning
theory (i.e. a theory about how knowledge is acquired) and as a pedagogy (i.e.
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 It is apposite to mention the work done in this regard by Johan Muller, Wally Morrow,1
Michael Young and Heila Lotz-Sisitka (see Muller, 2000 and 2005; Morrow, 2007 and
2009; Young 2007 and 2008; Lotz-Sisitka, 2009; see also Hugo, 2005). By contributing
ideas not covered in these texts, the present article will hopefully add momentum to the
push towards realism in South African educational thought.
a theory of teaching or instruction; Greek: paidagÇgia).  I will suggest,1
cautiously, that realism has distinct epistemological and ontological benefits
and certain educational advantages over competing theories.
“We, the people of South Africa,” begins the Preamble to the new
Constitution, “[r]ecognise the injustices of our past [and b]elieve that South
Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity” (Republic of South
Africa, 1996). Given that everyone has a right to (a basic and to further)
education, ensuring effective access to and implementation of this right means
“taking into account” not only “equity” but also “the need to redress the
results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices” (p.29). Carol Geary
Schneider refers to “diversity” as “shorthand for the different ways that human
variety [including human knowledge] is socially constructed and also as. . .
shorthand for the many forms of assault, and resistance to assault, against
stigmatised human difference” (Schneider, 1997, p.113; on the inclusion of
knowledge in ‘human variety’, see pp.126–127).
Responding to Schneider’s article, Malegapuru Makgoba emphasises
“diversity-focused, diversity-driven curriculum transformation” (Makgoba,
1997, p.138). He writes:
Educational processes and knowledge in pluralistic democracies are not neutral as they are
embedded in values of a society in time and space. . . Knowledge is a human construct that
by definition has a human purpose. Knowledge cannot be sterile or neutral in its conception,
formulation, interpretation and development. Humans are not generally renowned for their
neutrality or sterility in their thoughts. The generation and development of knowledge is thus
universal in nature even as its application is contextual (Makgoba, pp.142–143).
‘Knowledge diversity’ and truth: the postmodernist
and indigenous-knowledge turns
The emphasis on ‘knowledge diversity’ and ‘different ways of knowing’ (see
Green, 2008 and Murphy and McCormick, 2008, respectively) is fairly easy to
explain, in South African education as elsewhere, especially when one
considers the denigration, suppression and exploitation of so-called traditional
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 I return to this point later in the paper.2
knowledge systems during and even after colonialism. The reclamation project
that underlies this renewed focus is not only epistemological but also
concerned with legislation and social justice. As Mogobe Ramose has put it:
The history of epistemicide in South Africa raises fundamental questions of justice such as
the question of epistemological equality of all the existing paradigms of the peoples of South
Africa. Epistemological equality is a vital ingredient in the construction of a truly
representative South African identity expressed, among others, in the new South African
philosophy of education (Ramose, 2004, p.156).
Lesley Green focuses on “knowledge diversity” (which refers both to
“knowledge practices” and to “knowledge traditions”; Green, 2008, p.149), in
a critical response to realist and “universalist” conceptions of knowledge and
truth: 
While recognising the flaws in universalism and the need to value knowledge diversity, there
is a need to reject the idea of knowledges as mutually exclusive. . . In recognising a wider
range of cognitive practices and diverse moral economies of knowledge, scholarship on the
commensurability of the sciences and [indigenous peoples’] knowledges [IK] . . . can and
will impact on far more than village schoolrooms. . . . The focus on epistemically acceptable
practices, rather than universal truths (which can never be satisfactorily demonstrated)
suggests that the division of IK and the Sciences is spurious, without resorting to a
universalism in Science (Green, 2009, pp.51–52).
She argues that 
diverse epistemologies ought to be evaluated not on their capacity to express a strict realism
but on their ability to advance understanding. Such an approach allows for the evaluation of
the advancement of understanding without necessarily requiring the expression of the literal
truths that divide ‘belief’ from ‘knowledge’ (Green, 2008, p.144).
Apart from how – in the absence of such truths – one could make sense of
“understanding”,  a question that remains largely unaddressed is whether the2
ideas of “diverse moral economies of knowledge”, “epistemological equality
of all the existing paradigms” and of “diverse epistemologies”, and “different
ways of knowing”, make any sense. The case against “indigenous
knowledge”, and related ideas, is in essence the following: “indigenous
knowledge” is conceptually flawed, so it is best to abandon this idea, or at
least to reserve it for a considerably more circumscribed application –
especially in educational contexts (see Horsthemke, 2004, p.43; Horsthemke,
2008, p.305). A central problem appears to be the lack of clarity about the
meaning or understanding of ‘knowledge’, and what it is to ‘know’ something.
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In April 2007, the ISAPS (International Society of African Philosophy and Studies) 15th3
Annual Conference was hosted by the Rhodes University Philosophy Department in
Grahamstown, South Africa.
This quantitative or gradational understanding of truth is borrowed from Catherine Elgin4
(Elgin, 2004). There is a ‘threshold’ at which belief is strong enough and justification
becomes adequate, to qualify as conditions of knowledge. With the notion of ‘true
enough’, Elgin (and, following her, Green) wants to build a similar threshold into the
truth condition (p.115). I will discuss this idea later in the paper.
Defenders of these ideas distinguish between ‘skills’ and ‘knowledge’ – which
suggests, in the absence of any definition, that at least part of the
understanding concerns propositional (or theoretical, or factual) knowledge.
Insofar as ‘knowledge’ in this sense includes reference to ‘truth’, this invites
the perception of the latter also being ‘diverse’. Bluntly asserting, on more
than one occasion during the 2007 ISAPS conference,  that “truth is belief”,3
Kwasi Wiredu has asserted that reference to “infallible” truth is not only a bar
to dialogue but that “such a claim to knowledge is also a bar to education”
(Wiredu, 2004, p.24). Or take Michel Foucault’s account:
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint.
And it includes regular effects of power. Each society has its own regime of truth, its
‘general politics of truth’: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function
as true . . . (Foucault, 1987, pp.73–74).
This is also the view that Green seems to favour (see Green, 2008, p.154,
where she repeats Foucault’s dictum that “truth is . . . power”). Arguing that
knowledge “is constituted by what is ‘true enough’  for the task at hand. . .,4
rather than by access to an absolute truth” (p.147), she notes that “[o]ne cannot
simply discard the idea of IK without recognising the issues of power and
knowledge that undergird it” (Green, 2008). Elaborating on this last point,
Green states: 
The power/knowledge debate applies as much to the sciences as it does to claims to IK . . .
Knowledge has always been and will always be instrumentalised . . .[, for example] by
powerful lobbies within industry and government. (p.146) 
The reference to ‘power and knowledge’ as a necessary tandem is a
postmodernist red herring: it involves a category mistake. The epistemic is not
the political. When one account is true and another false, or one is adequately
justified and another only insufficiently so, it is fairly clear which one ought to
be favoured, on epistemic grounds, even though there may be grounds for
‘going soft’ on the other – like pedagogical reasons, reasons having to do with
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 Clearly, the practical (‘skill’) and familiarity senses of ‘indigenous knowledge’ should be5
acknowledged (and I have made this point before; see Horsthemke, 2004). But what else
is there in propositional knowledge, apart from content? To speak, as Green does, of
(Palikur astronomy as) “demonstrably valid knowledge” and (as communicating)
“verifiable knowledge” (Green, 2009, pp. 43, 46) is to employ tautologies. There could be
no knowledge that is anything but valid and verifiable.
Elgin may be right when she says that “a theory may be composed of both factual and6
fictional sentences” (Elgin, 2004, p.128). A scientist, however, can usually tell fact and
fiction apart.
social justice, (former) disenfranchisement, or simply with personal respect,
etc. On the view I am defending here, which is in essence a thoroughgoing
realism, it is possible at once morally to support, to empathise and sympathise
with the plight of, indigenous people (and to condemn and lobby against
‘Western’ denigration, suppression and exploitation) and to reject some of the
epistemological, metaphysical and ontological foundations of their
worldviews.  5
The following example is a case in point. ‘In Palikur astronomy’, Green
writes,
. . . the annual movements of specific constellations are related to seasonal rains in a way that
describes those constellations as the boats of shamans who bring the rains. The
constellations, in other words, are given material form, and cause is attributed to them. If one
were to reject as unscientific any explanatory model of the world that does not operate within
a strict realism, one could not accept this narrative as knowledge. Yet there is certainly a
correlation between the appearance of specific constellations in the hour before dawn, and
specific seasons. . . Is this narrative that attributes causal agency to inanimate objects really
that different to the immunologist’s metaphors of attack and defence that attributes agency to
cellular processes as if they are soldiers in a war? In other words, science does not operate
within a framework of strict realism in using its own models. Why judge a different
knowledge as false where it uses narrative models?’ (p.154; see also Green, 2009, pp.47 and
50)
The difference is that an immunologist is fully aware of the function of the
‘narrative model’, the metaphorical nature of the language employed, whereas
the Palikur astronomer actually fully believes that what happen to be
inanimate and fictional objects have not only causal agency but also a
purposive role in natural events.  Unlike the immunologist’s account, the6
Palikur theory is indifferent to evidence, is not “factually defeasible” (to use
Catherine Elgin’s words; Elgin, 2004, p.129), and therefore neither
scientifically tenable nor epistemically desirable. A theory is factually
defeasible if “there is some reasonably determinate, epistemically accessible
factual arrangement which, if found to obtain, would discredit the theory”
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(Elgin, 2004, p.129). Attempting to make the case for the scientific and
epistemological equivalence of Palikur astronomy (representing indigenous
knowledge systems, generally), Green contends that “no scientist believes that
Scorpius and Orion are literally an arachnid and a human, but the
constellations remain known by those names” (Green, 2008, p.156). This is
correct. The importance, however, is not constituted by the naming, but by the
accompanying beliefs, and the extent to which they reflect what is actually the
case. 
“If ‘true enough’ is valid for the purposes of communicating understanding in
the laws of physics”, Green suggests, 
the model of the relationship between the stars and the rains is adequate to the task of
communicating understanding of the complex movements of stars in relation to the seasons.
It is ‘true enough’ in its context. One might believe in the shamanic guiding of the star boats,
or one might accept that these sentences of the model are metaphorical: either way, they do
not need to be eliminated in order for the model of the sky to be valid, which is to say that
such models can be taught in school curricula, and included in the corpus of knowledge
promoted by the state in the task of extending citizenship to people who explain the
ecosystem with reference to the rains that come at the same time as certain stars. (Green,
2008, p155; emphasis mine)
Again, this analysis misses the point – namely, that some ‘models’ are false
(i.e. they do not even come close to ‘true enough’) and should not be taught.
The star boat narrative should not be taught in astronomy, although it might be
taught in cultural studies or classes on the history and function of myth.
Similarly, there is no place for creationism or intelligent design in biology
classes, although they arguably have a place in dedicated religious instruction.
Even more damagingly, perhaps, I do not think that the quantitative or
gradational conception of truth is plausible. Most obviously, unlike the other
conditions of knowledge (belief and justification; see Green, 2004; Green,
2008), truth is not a matter of degree. It is not a matter of more-or-less, but
rather of either-or. It is, indeed, the truth criterion so conceptualised that
serves as a kind of gate-keeping mechanism for realism. It enables us to say
that something is false, and at least to guard against all kinds of superstition
and “postmodernist claptrap” (to use Elgin’s apt phrase; Elgin, 2004, p.128)
being elevated to the status of knowledge. Green, in her concern for the
epistemological priority of understanding and of context, requires a ‘relaxed’
truth criterion for her account. This explains why she wants to substitute ‘true
enough’ for the truth condition of knowledge. Interestingly, this is a step that
not even Elgin, the originator of this notion, appears to be wholly willing to
take. The dilemma is made manifest in the following telling passage: 
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I am not saying that truth itself is a threshold concept. . . My point is rather that epistemic
acceptability turns not on whether a sentence is true but on whether it is true enough – that
is, on whether it is close enough to the truth. ‘True enough’ obviously has threshold. (Elgin,
p.115; emphasis added) 
On this account, the process of approximating truth is one of justification and/
or reliable production of reasons (both of which are, indeed, ‘threshold
concepts’): ‘true enough’ would amount to little more than ‘adequately
justified’, or ‘as reliable as can be reasonably expected’. Furthermore, if truth
is not a threshold concept but ‘true enough’ is, then the latter cannot do the
work of the former. If this is correct, the notion of ‘true enough’ has been
rendered redundant.
Understanding, context-dependence, and the problem
of constructivism in education
By the time students have completed their undergraduate teacher training,
certainly in South Africa, they have been thoroughly indoctrinated with
constructivism. (On the purported significance and relevance of constructivist
theory in today’s classrooms, see – for example – Delanty, 1997; Duffy and
Cunningham, 1996; Potter, 1996; Richardson, 2003; Von Glasersfeld, 2000;
Windschitl, 1999 and 2002.) It is generally assumed that it is only
constructivism that provides a compelling account of active, student centered
teaching and learning, and that rival pedagogies and learning theories err in
significant respects. According to Duffy and Cunningham, and also
Windschitl (Duffy and Cunningham, 1996, Windschitl, 1999 and 2002), one
of the most difficult underpinnings of constructivism for educators to embrace
is that there are no universal truths and that constructivism by its very nature
is not compatible with more objective forms of knowing. No wonder, one
might respond – since this can only be apprehended as a ‘universal truth’
itself, or in terms of an ‘objective form of knowing’, respectively. It would
appear then that in an important respect constructivism is self-undermining:
either there are universal truths (or objective forms of knowing), except this
particular one; or the statement in question does not itself constitute a
universal truth, or objective form of knowing. 
There is clearly a grain of truth in constructivism. Some facts are socially
constructed, the results of human description and designation – like pass
grades in tests or exams, codes of ethics, laws, speed limits, standards of
etiquette, culinary recipes, etc.: contingent facts that emanate from our social
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This is not the place for a detailed critique of these approaches. My sketchy remarks here
7
are unlikely to persuade anyone that constructivism, for example, should be rejected.
They merely serve to underline my misgivings about bestowing special status in
education on a theoretical orientation that is deeply problematic. (See also Benson and
Stangroom, 2006; Boghossian, 2006a and Boghossian, 2006b, for comprehensive and
elegantly argued critiques.) As Lotz-Sisitka claims, “education has a critical role to play
in preparing children to live in the world” (Lotz-Sisitka, 2009, p.71; emphasis added).
This arguably requires that those who so prepare children live there, too. Frankly, I
cannot see constructivism making a substantial contribution to this preparation process. 
practices. Constructivism errs, however, in saying that all facts, including
historical and scientific facts, are human constructs. As a pedagogy, I suggest,
constructivism has two major, related shortcomings. It degrades a fundamental
educational task – that of transmission of knowledge. Furthermore, like
postmodernism, constructivism is not only misleading but also potentially
dangerous, in that it gives people (educators as well as learners) a false sense
of empowerment and authority. In fact, neither approach is emancipatory, as
their advocates have contended (on this point, see Muller 2000, p.156). On the
contrary, both as a pedagogy and as a learning theory, constructivism is likely
to be disturbingly disempowering. The failure of outcomes-based education in
South Africa, with its devaluation of subject-based knowledge, knowledge
developed in the past and of knowledge for its own sake, is testimony to the
plausibility of this judgement.  7
Yet, does constructivism not find its natural home in ‘understanding’? After
all, the conceptual ambit of the latter includes people’s perception of a
situation, etc., and agreement among people – which appears to suggest that
such perception and agreement involve individuals’ construction of facts.
Understanding
What exactly is ‘understanding’, and what is its relation to truth? The short
answer would be that understanding is a mental process that is directed
towards truth, or aims at the way things are/the way the world is. (Note:
‘understanding’ does not necessarily mean actually ‘grasping the truth’. Our
perception of a situation may be incomplete, insufficiently informed, indeed
mistaken, as may agreement among people.) This becomes even clearer when
understanding is discussed in relation to ‘misunderstanding’, and when we
reflect on the meaning of the latter. Misunderstanding consists in “getting
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 The German word for perception, Wahrnehmung, is even more appropriate. Wahrnehmen8
(wahr/nehmen), to perceive, literally means ‘to take to be true’.
things wrong”, in perceiving  things/the world as they are not. However, this8
does not mean (as Elgin suggests it does; Elgin, 2004, p.120) that
“divergences from truth, even if unavoidable, are always cognitive defects”.
There is a distinct cognitive value that attaches to imagination, musings, and
fantasies. Nor does this mean that whenever things or the world are perceived
as they are not, they are misunderstood. The point is, plainly, that it is
important to be able to distinguish between fact and fiction, not to mistake
one’s imaginings for the way the world is (see also footnote 11 below). Yet,
even making mistakes – getting things wrong – is not necessarily a ‘cognitive
defect’, other things being equal. It is a natural part of the process of learning.
Learning to recognise one’s mistakes and to avoid error is a vital component
of understanding and, indeed, of getting closer to what the truth happens to be.
It underlies all scientific progress. However, I disagree with Elgin over
whether such approximation is a substitute for the truth criterion as such.
Realism, unlike postmodernism and constructivism, emphasises a reality or
“objectivity outside the discourse in which it is articulated” (Delanty, 1997,
p.130). The question that remains to be answered is whether all learning
processes are identical, whether we all operate under identical epistemic
conditions. The answer is an emphatic ‘no’ – and this is an answer that is also
available to realism, as I will argue below.
The importance of context
Can a non-constructivist, non-relativist account be given of the pedagogical
and educational significance of context? When the terms ‘knowledge’ and
‘knowing’ are employed in everyday language a distinction is generally made
between three different kinds of knowledge: acquaintance- or familiarity-type
knowledge (knowledge of a person, place, or thing), practical or skill-type
knowledge (knowledge how), and propositional (also called factual or
declarative) knowledge (knowledge that). When I say I know Mary Metcalfe,
this involves a different kind of knowledge-claim from that involved in saying
that I know how to bake bread. Asserting I know that the Taliban is not a rap
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This example is inspired by a favourite Bush-ism. When he was asked, during his 20009
presidential election campaign, about his take on the Taliban, George W. Bush is reported
to have responded, ‘Oh, I don’t follow rap music’. 
group  in turn involves a kind of knowledge-claim different from the first two.9
There may often be an overlap between the different kinds of knowledge.
Nevertheless, the distinction is generally thought to be useful. 
Whereas the first two types are fairly uncontroversial, it is the third type of
knowledge that is more complex. Belief is the subjective component of
(propositional/theoretical/factual) knowledge, while truth constitutes its
objective anchor. While beliefs may vary from individual to individual,
society to society, culture to culture – and indeed in terms of strength and
duration –, truth does not so vary. Truth refers to what is the case,
independently of what individuals believe, think or feel may be the case –
independently of their interests and preferences, and even of public and
general consensus. 
The third component, justification, has a kind of bridging role between the
subjective and the objective, between belief and truth. Thus, what counts as
suitable justification is determined by degree, kind and context of justification.
As far as the requisite degree of justification is concerned, minimal
justification is clearly not enough, while conclusive justification is usually not
available. Normally (other than in mathematics and in deductive logic) we
accept justification that is less than conclusive, i.e. reasons that are nonetheless
compelling. Different kinds of justification include observation, sense
experience, introspection, memory, oral and written testimony, and different
(deductive and non-deductive) kinds of reasoning.
Considerations of context bear on the attribution of knowledge insofar as it
concerns not only self- but also (and especially) other-ascription, the framing
question being: ‘Under what circumstances can I/others be said to know?’
Attribution of knowledge is context-sensitive – which exemplifies what might
be called the ‘social component’ of knowledge. What does this mean? What is
considered suitable justification in the case of a small child may not be what is
deemed suitable in the case of an older person or adult. The notion of
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Scheffler initially employs the notion of ‘(evidential) adequacy’, only to substitute it later
10
with the more general notion of ‘good reasons’. I take ‘suitable justification’ to encompass
both ‘adequate evidence’ and ‘good reasons’ and, therefore, to cover a wider range of
applications than each of these two notions on their own. To possess suitable justification is
(in a phrase Scheffler borrowed from A.J. Ayer) to have “the right to be sure”.
suitability’  Israel Scheffler argues, “involves standards, which are normally10
applied more strictly in some cases, more approximately in others, thus giving
rise to multiple interpretations of knowing” (Scheffler, 1965, p.96; it should be
noted that he refers to “multiple interpretations of knowing” – not to “multiple
ways of knowing” or to “multiple knowledges”). He suggests a subtle shift
from examining beliefs to examining the contexts in which beliefs are
advanced as knowledge-claims. In other words, he suggests that we
distinguish the question concerning justificational suitability (of a belief) from
the “question of appraisal of the believer” (Scheffler, p.102). “To speak of the
right to be sure is, in the present context, to appraise the credentials of belief
from the vantage point of our own standards; it is to spell out the attitude of
these standards toward specific credentials offered for a belief”, Scheffler
contends ( p.102). 
It is plausible to maintain that someone (e.g. a six-year-old) has good reasons
if, given her reasoning ability, it is (epistemically) permissible for her to
believe that something is the case. In other words, it makes excellent
(epistemic as well as educational) sense to apply standards of suitability (of
justification) more leniently in the case of the six-year-old and more strictly in
the case of the sixteen-year-old. The important point for educators is that what
counts, for example, as a good reason depends on who is giving the reason and
in what context. One of the responsibilities of an educator is to assess learners’
knowledge in a way that is sensitive both to their level of understanding and to
the context of assessment. 
When is an educator entitled to say that a learner knows something (in the
sense of knowing that) or has adequate justification for making a knowledge-
claim? To put the question more formally: Under what conditions may an
educator attribute knowledge to a learner? When we judge that someone has
suitable justification, we are judging that he has a rational/justificational case
that he can understand, according to Scheffler: “In saying he knows, we are
not merely ascribing true belief but asserting that he has proper credentials for
such belief, the force of which he himself appreciates” (Scheffler, p.112).
Scheffler’s arguments imply that even if a learner has subjectively good
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This is where the notion of ‘true enough’ may seem to gain a foothold. While it certainly11
makes sense to speak of correct deductive reasoning, I would suggest that this descriptor
even applies to non-deductive reasoning. The latter can be correct, given the parameters
of these (inductive, analogical and abductive) kinds of reasoning, without being
conclusive. (It should also be noted that deductive reasoning may be correct, i.e. display
correct logical form, without yielding a true conclusion. In fact, all component
propositions may be false.) Just as there are different levels of reasoning, and reasoning
ability, there will be different standards of correctness.
reasons for believing something to be true, she does not have knowledge
unless she also has intersubjectively good reasons (and, of course, unless her
belief is true). One of the tasks of an educator will be to assist learners in
acquiring the relevant concepts and intersubjective standards of justification. I
am not talking about perfect reasons; I am (with Scheffler) talking about good
(or compelling) reasons. An important feature of what constitutes good
reasons is that they are reliably produced. If reasons are unreliably produced,
they cannot function as justification for one’s belief/s. What does ‘reliably
produced’ mean? For one thing, one’s sense experiences must be reliably
connected with the world, one’s sense organs must be intact, etc. For another,
one’s reasoning must be of a requisite standard  – sufficiently critical,11
rigorous, adequately and appropriately informed, and so on.
This analysis of good reasons indicates why reference to them is context-
sensitive. Neither our reasoning nor our sense-experiences are infallible.
Nonetheless, if they are generally reliable sources of justification, the reasons
they produce might be called intersubjectively certain. If reference to good
reasons is context-sensitive, does this mean that the criteria for knowledge-
ascription change with the respective social group? Is knowledge itself
relative? In Plato’s cave parable, whatever the enlightened person knows
about ‘reality’ stands in stark contrast to the (majority) view that what the
prisoners in the cave claim to know is reality. Does this indicate that
knowledge is ambiguous between various concepts, each based on a different
standard? Is this knowledge context-dependent? Scheffler’s arguments suggest
that it may be better to say that attributions of knowledge are context-sensitive.
This is because the term ‘context-sensitive’ does not offer an open invitation
to epistemological relativism – indeed, not even to ‘knowledge diversity’. The
‘diversity’ in question pertains to reasons and to justification. 
Regarding the different knowledge claims one is likely to encounter in one’s
own teaching practice, these usually include moral, scientific, and emotional
knowledge claims, amongst many others. Thus, one might encounter different
claims about the goodness or badness of certain practices; different levels of
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mathematical reasoning, different (more and less sophisticated) claims about,
e.g., pollution; and examples of introspection – ‘This poem makes me feel
sad’ – and literary analysis – ‘This poem is meant to evoke feelings of sadness
in the reader, by means of the following. . .’. It is important to note that a small
child’s claims are accepted as ‘knowledge’ only if they are true, and the same
– obviously – goes for the claims of older persons. Truth does not vary
according to particular individuals, social groups or societies. This serves to
indicate why, as educators, we are more lenient in some cases than in others –
but also why our leniency does not extend to condoning untruths or
falsehoods.
Reality, facts, truth, knowledge – and education: the
realist rejoinder 
The present section considers the relationship between some of the key
cognitive and educational concepts from a broadly realist perspective. Realism
is the view that there are facts, a reality, a world that exists independently of
me, the researcher, the subject of inquiry – i.e. independently of the discourses
in which these facts etc. are articulated. 
Realism, reality and objectivity refer to what is the case independently of the
individual’s personal or social constructs and designations, and the procedures
for understanding that reality (see Pring, 2004; Willaschek, 2005). Different
cultural descriptions come up against the hard facts of reality, of what actually
is the case. The viability of these differences depends on features of reality/the
world that makes them possible. The present government usually offers a clear
example of social construction, and many people are employed to construct
that reality to suit the purposes of the politicians. ‘Inclusive education’,
‘investment in education’ and ‘expansion of provision’, like the former US
government’s slogan ‘No child left behind’, are constantly being
‘reconstructed’. But every so often a hard-nosed realist will ask, “What about
the over-crowded classrooms?” or “Where is the teacher?”, and point out that
children have really not had anything to eat or have been violated (see Pring,
2004, p.212). Realism in this sense enables the distinction between subjective
and objective accounts: the latter involve examination of the evidence, logical
inquiry and the like. Of course, to be objective or to proceed objectively is not
the same as being right. Objectivity (like subjectivity) refers to the way I go
about my inquiry.
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 It is important to distinguish between what actually took place and the subjective feel of12
one’s experiences, memories, reflections, etc. (Take the Truth & Reconciliation
Commission hearings, for example, and the misleading accounts of ‘different truths’ that
have been produced. Reconciliation is a social construct; truth is not. Truth necessarily
precedes reconciliation: there can, strictly speaking, be no reconciliation without truth.) 
Truth refers to what ‘is’ the case; what is in agreement with fact or reality.
Consider the following claims:
• ‘There is no such thing as (universal) truth.’
• ‘What is true for you is not necessarily what is true for me.’
·
As I have indicated earlier, contra constructivism, it makes good sense to take
issue with these statements. It makes sense to deny what is said here – and to
do this is to concede that what has been said might be wrong, and that its
negation would be correct. Otherwise, what is the point of disagreeing or
arguing? Or what is the point of asserting a point of view? This leads to the
unavoidable position that statements (insofar as they are meaningful) are
either true or false.
Without being able to elaborate on the matter, and to critique rival conceptions
of truth (coherence, consensus, pragmatism, redundancy, etc.), I am
suggesting here that the commonsense account of truth assumes that there is at
least some correspondence between the statements I utter and the world as it
exists, i.e. independently of me. (Pring, p.213; but see also Delanty, who
states: “Constructivists and realists are both united in the rejection of
correspondence theories of truth”, yet fails to defend this claim; Delanty,
1997, p.132.) The central element of correspondence theories of truth is that,
other things being equal, the truth/falsity of what is said has something to do
with a reality that is independent of the statements made about it. I might
legitimately for different purposes describe the world in many different ways.
But for those descriptions and distinctions to stick, there must be features of
the world that enable them to be made. One cannot get away from reality –
and from the truth/falsity of statements that give an account of it.12
My contention is that realism offers a more coherent account than rival
theories of the relationship, including the differences, between cognitive and
educational concepts. How, then, are the cognitive notions of knowing and
believing related to the educational notions of learning and teaching
(Scheffler, 1965, p.7)? Learning that seems to imply believing that, but not
knowing that. Successful teaching involves the learner coming to believe
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something. The converse does not apply: one may come to learn something
without having been taught. What makes teaching ‘successful’ is not merely
that the learner believes what the educator takes to be true, but that the subject
matter is true. As I have indicated earlier (and previously: Horsthemke, 2004),
knowing has not only a propositional/factual but also a practical/skill sense
(knowing that, knowing how). Believing, on the other hand, is only
propositional (believing that). According to Scheffler, knowing thus has a
larger range than believing, and “learning and teaching are at least as large in
range as knowing” (Scheffler 1965, p.17). Both also have practical/skill sense
(teaching how, learning how), in addition to being used propositionally
(teaching that, learning that), unlike believing. (As the following table
indicates, the acquaintance/familiarity sense of knowing is neither shared by
believing nor by the educational concepts in question – which accounts for its
educational irrelevance.)
knowing believing teaching learning
acquaintance/
familiarity
% x x x
practical/skill % x % %
propositional/factual/
theoretical
% % % %
Yet, the range of education also goes beyond that of knowledge: we also
employ these concepts in terms of learning to and teaching to, unlike
knowing. The same goes for learning and teaching, but not knowing, with
regard to appreciation of music and/or development of understanding. It is
important to note that teaching/learning how arguably involve knowing how –
whereas teaching/learning that do not necessarily involve knowing that.
Teaching that does not even imply believing that, although learning that
seems to. This serves to explain, inter alia, how indoctrination takes place.
Unlike indoctrination, and arguably also unlike constructivism, realism as a
pedagogy involves a special type of rational persuasion the aim of which is to
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The ceteris paribus clause is significant here: as I have indicated above, there is a13
distinct cognitive value that attaches to imagination, musings, and fantasies. Far from
advocating a Platonic curriculum that permits only certain kinds of art, music and poetry
(and only in the early stages of the curriculum) and assigns to these at best instrumental
value, I am suggesting here merely that (for example) creativity and aesthetic
appreciation ought to be guided by the ability to distinguish between fiction and fact,
between fantasy and the way the world is. 
convince or persuade others of a truth. Teaching in this sense engages both the
guidelines for the validity and soundness of arguments (the conclusion should
follow from the premises; arguments should consist entirely of true
propositions) as well as the understanding of propositional knowledge
characterised above. In other words, educative discourse should consist only
of statements of sincere belief that are true and suitably justified – other things
being equal.  Whether an educator’s audience comprises learners, their13
parents or her own colleagues, the aim is to get them to accept what is true
rather than to achieve consensus. If consensus were the sole aim of successful
teaching, then it would be permissible “to suppress evidence in the interest of
consensus” (Goldman, 1992, p.189). Think of a creationist biology teacher, in
this regard, and historical, anthropological and paleontological evidence for
the evolution of humankind. It would be undesirable, further, to introduce
evidence that would threaten to undermine (pre-existing) consensus
(Goldman, 1992). Again, in a strongly religious school context, scientific
evidence for the origin and development of humankind is unlikely to be
covered. Finally, it would be legitimate to secure consensus through artificial
means, even by (latent threat of) force (Goldman, 1992). This, of course,
characterises any totalitarian society or system whose continued existence
crucially depends on suppression of dissent/dissensus and critical interrogation
of the status quo. Not only may what everyone (or the majority) agrees on be
false (think of a flat-earth society in this regard), but the above implications
also render the sole focus on consensus both epistemically and pedagogically
undesirable.
Following Alvin Goldman, in terms of good epistemic practice in teaching,
like rational persuasion, an educator (the ‘epistemic exemplar’) should
! assert a conclusion only if she believes it;
! assert a premise only if she believes it;
! assert a premise only if she thinks she has suitable justification for
believing it; and 
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! affirm a conclusion on the basis of stated premises only if (a) those
premises, together with unstated premises justifiably believed by the
person, strongly support the conclusion, (b) she believes that they
strongly support it, and (c) she is justified in believing that they strongly
support it (Goldman, 1994, pp.33, 34, 36).
Of course, there ought to be room for trying on an argument for size, or for
playing devil’s advocate (Goldman, 1994, p.33). For pedagogical reasons,
however, the practitioner’s intentions should arguably be transparent. For such
argumentation to have any educational value, the educator’s strategy should be
clearly discernible to the intended audience. A related instance of
exemplifying good epistemic practice is provided by W.V. Quine and J.S.
Ullian, in their discussion of rational persuasion: 
What may occasionally happen is that our challenge [of another person’s beliefs] is met by
so able a defense that we find ourselves persuaded. In this event we are led to give up the
very belief that we originally sought to propagate. This is the best outcome of all, if we like
surprises and are bent on learning things (Quine and Ullian, 1978, p.132).
Epistemology, education and the ‘real world’
A context-sensitive realist account acknowledges that people do not have the
same cognitive resources, skills and opportunities. They do not all act or
operate in the absence of time constraints. Their situations are characterised by
different levels of expertise, by different opportunities to access and gather
information, by different levels of cognitive maturity and training and by
considerable differences in time constraints. As Goldman has cautioned, a
“social epistemology for the real world needs to take these constraints into
account” (Goldman, 1992, p.223).
What I propose in the present paper, then, is that we revisit realism both as a
pedagogy (in that it is able to delve into specific delivery mechanisms – in
terms of non-indoctrinative instruction in critical and creative thinking and
correct reasoning) and as a learning theory (in that its ontological and
epistemological presuppositions are less problematic than those of competing
learning theories). Obviously, more work needs to be done, especially in terms
of the psychology of teaching and learning – which explains the present,
‘cautious’ defence of realism.
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‘The teacher: Si Fu, name the central questions of philosophy!
14
Si Fu: Are things outside of us, for themselves, also without us, or are the things within
us, for ourselves, not without us?
The teacher: Which opinion is the correct one?
Si Fu: No verdict has been reached yet.
The teacher: What was the latest tendency among the majority of our philosophers?
Si Fu: The things are outside of us, for themselves, also without us.
The teacher: Why did the question remain unsolved?
Si Fu: The congress that was supposed to yield the final verdict took place, as it has done
for the past two hundred years, in the monastery Mi Sang, on the banks of the Yellow
River. The question was: Is the Yellow River real, or does it exist only in people’s heads?
During the congress, however, there was a melting of snow in the mountains, and the
Yellow River rose above its banks and swept away the monastery Mi Sang and all
congress participants. The proof that the things are outside of us, for themselves, also
without us, therefore, has not been furnished.’ (Bertolt Brecht, Turandot or The Congress
of Whitewashers; my translation)
Postscript 
The following is a pertinent excerpt from a play by Bertolt Brecht:
Der Lehrer: Si Fu, nenne uns die Hauptfragen der Philosophie!
Si Fu: Sind die Dinge außer uns, für sich, auch ohne uns, oder sind die Dinge in uns,
für uns, nicht ohne uns?
Der Lehrer: Welche Meinung ist die richtige?
Si Fu: Es ist keine Entscheidung gefallen.
Der Lehrer: Zu welcher Meinung neigte zuletzt die Mehrheit unserer Philosophen?
Si Fu: Die Dinge sind außer uns, für sich, auch ohne uns.
Der Lehrer: Warum blieb die Frage ungelöst?
Si Fu: Der Kongress, der die Entscheidung bringen sollte, fand, wie seit zweihundert
Jahren, im Kloster Mi Sang statt, welches am Ufer des Gelben Flusses liegt. Die
Frage hieß: Ist der Gelbe Fluss wirklich, oder existiert er nur in den Köpfen?
Während des Kongresses aber gab es eine Schneeschmelze im Gebirge, und der
Gelbe Fluss stieg über seine Ufer und schwemmte das Kloster Mi Sang mit allen
Kongressteilnehmern weg. So ist der Beweis, dass die Dinge außer uns, für sich,
auch ohne uns sind, noch nicht erbracht worden.14
(Bertolt Brecht, Turandot oder Der Kongress der Weißwäscher, Stücke, Band 14, p.36)
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